Setting Tempo – It works for strong leaders with strong teams … and for getting a little TV time
(Originally published in Velonews) by René and Kendra Wenzel
 

The fortunate cycling fans who have been able to tune in to Outdoor Life Network the past few years have likely been exposed to the strategy of setting tempo in modern cycling via the Giro, the Tour and the Vuelta. Whether it’s Mario Cipollini’s zebra gang, U.S. Postal’s blue train, or some other squad, the sight of a single team lining it up at the front is common during TV coverage of the three grand tours. But what’s to be gained, or lost, by setting tempo, and how did the practice become so common?

HOW IT STARTED

Setting tempo is not a new phenomenon. It was essentially created by Eddy Merckx in the late 1960s and early ’70s as a means of softening up the true climbers, such as José Manuel Fuente and Lucien Van Impe, on the flats before the climbs — and of shelling many of these climbers on the early part of the slopes as a result of the “softening.” Then Merckx could deal with the climbs himself in a steady-state fashion that best suited his style.

So what is this tempo-setting, really? What is it good for, other than what is briefly described above?

Setting tempo is the practice of a particular team or teams intentionally keeping the pace high at a certain point in a race to discourage attacks, make the race difficult, or even demoralize the competition. Setting tempo has developed since Merckx’s heyday and is now used for several different purposes. It’s difficult to pinpoint exactly when setting tempo became an everyday tactic, but here are a few common thoughts, theories and myths about the strategy.

By the end of the Merckx reign in the ’70s, another Belgian superstar made his entrance to the world stage of cycling. His name was Freddy Maertens, and while he was a strong all-rounder, his forte was sprinting. He was the Cipollini of his day, albeit less specialized.

His team, Flandria, with riders such as Michel Pollentier and Marc Demeyer — both top riders in their own right — would take the lead sometimes 20 miles from the finish line and crank up the speed to discourage any thoughts of beating Maertens in a sprint. This planted the seeds for the lead-out style that Cipo’s team has brought to full flower today. Understanding the benefits of a strong lead-out, setting tempo in its fastest form, does not require a degree in rocket science.

BEING SEEN

As American superstar Greg LeMond began winning his Tours de France, cycling was becoming a global sport, and Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Italy no longer held a near-monopoly in top international racing. Sponsorships exploded to heights never seen before in cycling, mostly due to TV’s ability to broadcast virtually immediately anywhere in the world. It had become very important for the sponsors to have “guaranteed TV time” — and the tempo-setting of the modern grand tours, particularly the Tour de France, is intended to give them this.

Today, a team may be setting tempo on day three of the Giro d’Italia not because it hopes to defend a leader’s jersey through the next 20 days, but because every day they hold onto it has enormous commercial value. Every day in the leader’s jersey means millions of media hits. In terms of racing strategy, this is probably not so smart, but “strategy” can be made up of many components, and if the team’s strategy is to make its sponsors happy via TV time, then it works.

However, many misconstrue this strategy as a race-winning strategy. It rarely is, for most in the overall GC. And as regards the much-coveted TV time, setting tempo really only works in the three grand tours, as they are the only multiple-day events in the world with daily, multiple-hour TV coverage.

OTHER REASONS TO SET TEMPO

Four-time Tour de France winner Lance Armstrong has used the tempo-setting strategy and made it a winning one. But it only works if you have a very strong team and the strongest individual. If the strongest team with the strongest contender is using the strategy of setting tempo, it pretty much cancels out other teams’ use of the same — barring commercial reasons as described above.

If a strong team without a strong leader tries this strategy, it is likely to fail. Same goes for a strong leader with a weak team. A team with a non-favorite in the leader’s jersey is much better off using this “day in the limelight” to take advantage of the attention placed on the jersey-wearer by putting one or two teammates into contention in the general classification in a breakaway.

But in today’s racing environment, setting tempo has become an unwritten rule for teams that hold the leader’s jersey. It is used widely on all levels, in all kinds of events, and even traditional, experienced directors become angry and accusative when this “golden rule” is not followed. It has almost become a strategy in itself to lure a team into the leader’s jersey early in a stage race, so that they then have to defend and can then be taken advantage of tactically.

Are there other advantages of setting tempo? Sure. In a crosswind, tempo can make or break a contender’s day, depending on where he was when it started. Also, when one sees Marco Pantani’s Mercatone Uno squad setting tempo 10 miles from the finish, it is not because they hope Pantani has found his sprinting legs, but merely to keep him out of the carnage of a sprint, in which the sprinters — and those who think they are sprinters —shoulder their way to the front, to the endangerment of everybody else. However, when Pantani and his team set tempo 40 miles from the finish on a flat day, it is usually all about publicity.

Setting tempo is a valid strategy, but only when the situation has been well analyzed. It really is only a strategy for the strongest team, with the best rider in the correct situation and at the right time.